On October 6, thousands of Israelis woke up to the sound of sirens blaring across several cities. Hamas, a Palestinian group, had launched a massive attack on Israeli soil, utilizing around 5,000 rockets from Gaza and carrying out a land-sea-air offensive. Panic spread as reports surfaced of Hamas fighters infiltrating towns, kibbutz communities, and even an outdoor music festival. Israelis feared terrorist attacks, with stories circulating of civilians being shot or abducted.
This assault by Hamas was accompanied by boats and motorized paragliders that breached Israeli soil using guerilla tactics. It has resulted in hundreds of deaths, making it the deadliest attack on Israeli soil since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Despite the efforts of Shin Bet and Mossad, Israel’s renowned security and intelligence services, the attacks and casualties have dealt a significant blow to Mossad’s reputation.
Mossad, with its $3 billion annual budget and 7,000-strong staff, is the second-largest espionage agency in the West, second only to the CIA. Its chief, David “Dadi” Barnea, was selected through a secretive process known only to a few individuals in the Israeli prime minister’s office, the agency itself, and the Civil Service Advisory Committee.
While the internal structure of Mossad remains mostly hidden, it consists of various departments. These include the Collections Department, responsible for espionage worldwide, and the Political Action and Liaison Department, which conducts political activities in collaboration with friendly foreign intelligence services. The agency’s Special Operations Division, also known as Metsada, carries out sensitive missions such as assassinations, sabotage, and psychological warfare. Additionally, there is the LAP (Lohamah Psichologit) Department, responsible for psychological warfare and deception, the Research Department, which produces intelligence reports, and the Technology Department, which develops advanced technologies to support Mossad operations.
The failure to anticipate the recent Hamas attack has raised questions about Mossad’s usually impeccable success rate in thwarting external threats. Critics wonder how Hamas managed to accumulate thousands of rockets and missiles so close to Israeli soil without being detected by Israeli intelligence. Furthermore, they question why Israel’s reliable Iron Dome missile defense system was unable to intercept all the incoming projectiles from Gaza.
Despite the high-tech security measures in place along the Gaza-Israel border, including cameras, ground-motion sensors, and regular army patrols, Hamas successfully infiltrated through the fence, cutting holes in the wire and arriving by sea on boats and paragliders. The magnitude and complexity of the attack, along with the coordination and months of planning it required, raise serious concerns about how Israel’s near-perfect intelligence agency failed to detect it.
Some have drawn parallels between this failure and the 9/11 attacks in New York, which shook not only the CIA but also the global intelligence network as a whole.